

15 August 1966

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


# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

JCS and State department  
review(s) completed.

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GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

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
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**SOUTH VIETNAM  
CURRENT SITUATION**

0 25 50 75 100 Miles  
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Significant allied actions were confined to three operations over the weekend.

In Quang Tri Province, four battalions of US Marines continued the eleven-day search-and-destroy Operation PRAIRIE near the DMZ. The operation, which has so far resulted in five US and 68 enemy killed, is a continuation of Operation HASTINGS. [(See Map)]

Thirty miles south of Da Nang, US Marine and ARVN units in Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 have reported light contact with an enemy force believed to include more than 3,000 men. Air strikes on 13 August killed 33 Viet Cong soldiers, bringing to 397 the number of enemy dead since the operation began on 3 August. [(See Map)]

Press reports say that units of Operation PAUL REVERE II are attempting to surround a Communist battalion of perhaps 500 troops in Pleiku Province. Initial allied losses are one (US) killed and five (US) wounded. Enemy losses are not known. [(See Map)]

[(Political Developments in South Vietnam: There are continuing indications that a breakdown in negotiations between the government and FULRO, the dissident tribal autonomy movement, may be nearing.)]


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[redacted] the chief negotiator for FULRO, Y-Dhe Adrong, has stated that he will return to Cambodia if Premier Ky does not reply to FULRO demands by 15 August. Adrong, who has been in Darlac Province with a negotiating team since early July, reportedly intends to stage an antigovernment demonstration before returning to Cambodia. [(See Map)]

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NORTH VIETNAM — SITES OF NAVAL ACTIVITY

12-13 August 1966



[General Vinh Loc, II Corps Commander, has reportedly ordered the chief of Darlac Province to seize six **FULRO** hostages in order to force other dissidents in the province and in Cambodia to return to government control. Although it is not clear, the intended hostages may be members of Adrong's group. Such an action by the government at this time would almost certainly end any hope for an early reconciliation.]

Military Developments in North Vietnam: At least 11 North Vietnamese **POL** barges and three **PT** boats were destroyed this weekend by US Navy aircraft. Seven of the barges were apparently carrying oil off-loaded from a tanker, probably the Soviet ship **Komsomol**, anchored near **Cac Ba** island when they were attacked. Eight probable **Swatow**-class motor gun boats were observed providing fire support for the tanker and barges. An **F-8E Crusader** was shot down by gunfire during the engagement, but the pilot was rescued. [(See Map)]

25X1 North Vietnam has now lost 11 naval vessels since 1 July 1966 when its combatant force was numbered at 40 ships. The commitment of as many as eight boats to protect the tanker off-loading operation may indicate that Hanoi attaches considerable importance to this method of bringing **POL** into the **Haiphong** area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Communist China: The communique issued by the central committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 13 August, following a plenary meeting, does little but reaffirm domestic and foreign policy lines expounded at length over the past year.

It appears to be largely an attempt to give the impression that the entire party leadership is united under Mao and to counter recent indications of high-level disarray.

The purposefully bland nature of the communique can be seen in the failure to name the speakers and participants in the 1-12 August plenum--the first held in four years--and in its lack of allusion to senior party figures who have recently fallen in the cultural purification drive. The communique made no reference to a demand last week in the authoritative party journal Red Flag that the purification drive should focus on bringing down more "powerful party figures."

On economic matters, the communique talked of a new "leap forward," but did not specify what measures were being adopted to achieve this. In other statements, it suggested that the regime is still taking a cautious attitude toward any basic changes in economic policies.

In the foreign policy area, the communique broke no new ground. On aid to Vietnam, it merely endorsed all measures which had been or might be taken "in consultation" with Hanoi. It also reaffirmed Peking's intention to press the all-out drive against Soviet revisionism and once again insisted that there can be "no middle road"--a clear-cut challenge to the North Korean and Japanese Communists who have grown increasingly independent of the Chinese.

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NOTE

Dominican Republic: Unrest has mounted following a week of terrorist incidents and government efforts to clamp down on political activity. A fire-fight between police and suspected former rebel elements erupted on 12 August after the mortal wounding of Ramon Mejia del Castillo, a popular rebel commando leader. President Balaguer's intention to impose a two-year political truce appears to be shaping up into the first major issue between his administration and critics who charge that it would lay the groundwork for a new dictatorship.

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**THE PRESIDENT**

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistants to the President

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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